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INTRODUCTION
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 [hereinafter FHAA or the
Act]' represents the culmination of a ten-year effort to expand the federal gov-
ernment's enforcement authority over complaints of housing discrimination.
The original anti-discrimination legislation, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 [hereinafter 1968 Act],2 commonly known as the Fair Housing Act,
was enacted in the wake of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination and the
urban unrest of the 1960s.3 The 1968 Act proscribed discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin or religion in the sale or rental of private
housing.4 While the Act expressed a strong national policy directed toward
the elimination of racial bias in housing,5 it provided no effective administra-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B., 1972, Barnard College; J.D., 1975,
Rutgers University School of Law. I would gratefully like to acknowledge the research assist-
ance of Harvey Mechanic, Geanine Towers-Dioso and the support provided by the Brooklyn
Law School summer research stipend program. I would also like to thank Bonnie Milstein of
the Mental Health Law Project for her helpful comments.
1. Pub. L. No. 100430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.CA. §§ 3601-3620, 3631
(West Supp. 1989)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by Act of Sept. 13,
1988, Pub. L. No. 100430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
3. For the legislative history of the 1968 Act, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative
History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBuRN L.J. 149 (1969); see also Comment, The Federal Fair
Housing Requirement Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DuKE L. 733.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968). The Act also prohibited discriminatory advertising, financing,
and brokerage service. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c), 3605, 3606 (1968). In 1974, the Act was
amended to bar housing discrimination on the basis of sex. Act of August 22, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-383, § 808(G)(1)-(3), 88 Stat. 729 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C §§ 3604-3606).
5. See, ag., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Williams v.
755
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tive mechanism for resolving statutory claims. The agency charged with en-
forcement, the Department of Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter
HUD], was given authority merely "to try to eliminate or correct" discrimina-
tory practices "by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persua-
sion."6 The only other avenue of relief for an individual complainant under
the statute was a private action brought in federal court.7 Government spon-
sored litigation was limited to "pattern or practice" actions brought at the
discretion of the Justice Department.8
For reasons obviously not limited to the failure of statutory enforcement,
the 1968 Act had little impact on the elimination of housing discrimination.
One oft-cited study estimated that two million acts of discrimination in the
sale or rental of real estate occur annually, and that an African-American
renter will experience discrimination in 75% of contacts with the housing
market.9 Whatever the complex causes of continuing discrimination, how-
ever, Congress and civil rights advocates saw the 1968 Act's failure to provide
efficient enforcement mechanisms as a materially weak link in the federal ef-
fort to address the problem of bias.10 Attempts to amend the statute to pro-
vide agency enforcement beyond conciliation began in 1980 following
Mathews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974); Williamsburg
Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing Authority, 450 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1968).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1968). If an administrative complaint was filed, the aggrieved party
had to give the agency 30 days to attempt conciliation before bringing a civil action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(d) (1968). There was no requirement that a party exhaust the administrative process, or
utilize it at all. See, eg., Concerned Tenants of Indian Trails Apartments v. Indian Trails
Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp.
1379 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1968). The Justice Department's efforts under this section have never
been particularly vigorous, and during the years of the Reagan administration, the thrust of
enforcement was primarily directed to attacking affirmative action in housing. See Kushner,
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1049, 1069 n.79, 1081-1086 (1989); see also Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the
Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 376 (1988); Wolvovitz & Lobel, The Enforce-
ment of Civil Rights Statutes: The Reagan Administration's Record, 9 BLACK L.J. 252, 257-58
(1986).
9. See Kushner, supra note 8, at 1052 & n.7; accord H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 2176 [hereinafter HousE REn'ORT];
Note, Recent Developments: Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 249, 254 (1989).
10. The House Report states that the Judiciary Committee viewed lack of enforcement
mechanisms "as the primary weakness in existing law." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 15;
see also id. at 16 ("Existing law has been ineffective because it lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism"). The House Report and the House and Senate debates comprise the primary
sources of the FHAA's legislative history. The Senate adopted the House bill, H.R. 1158, with
only minor amendments, and did not publish a committee report. 134 CONG. REC. S10,454-5
(daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988). Several senators referred to the House Report as the authoritative
interpretation of the bill. See, eg., 134 CONG. REc. S10,462 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy); 134 CONG. REc. S10,464 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
For an extended discussion of enforcement problems, see generally UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 21, 32
(1979); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRONGER FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT NEEDED TO
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extensive congressional hearings. Bills were introduced and additional hear-
ings conducted in almost every subsequent year until passage of the Act.1
Finally, the 100th Congress adopted the Fair Housing Amendments Act,
which became effective on March 12, 1989.12 It provides for full adjudicatory
resolution of housing discrimination complaints at the agency level.
The FHAA is not only a statute directed at procedural reform. It also
greatly expands the 1968 Act's substantive protection by adding two new pro-
tected classes: families with children and disabled persons.13 The added pro-
tections for these groups has far reaching implications which go beyond
traditional notions of individual discrimination. New multi-family construc-
tions to provide access for people with disabilities will be required, 14 for exam-
ple, and substantial restrictions on "adult" housing developments will be
imposed.15
The FHAA's substantive provisions have been considered by other com-
mentators. 6 The extension of protection to new classes of persons is ad-
dressed here only where issues regarding enforcement arise. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that the procedural issues and concerns raised in this Article
probably will be addressed in the first instance in claims of discrimination on
the basis of disability. Advocates for clients with disabilities are in the best
position to test HUD's commitment to implementing the amendments, be-
cause these claims may not be subject to referral to state agencies during the
extended implementation period provided for in the Act. 7
The FHAA has been heralded as a breakthrough in civil rights law,18
presenting novel approaches to the traditional disincentives of delay and ex-
pense in enforcement, and indeed, its structure may create an effective mecha-
UPHOLD FAro HOUSING LAWS (1978); Chandler, Fair Housing Laws - A Critique, 24 HAs-
TINGS hi. 159, 189-205 (1973).
11. For a summary of legislative efforts to amend the Fair Housing Act, see HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 14-15; see also Kushner, supra note 8, at 1087 n.156.
12. The House bill, H.R. 1158, was passed on June 29, 1988 by a vote of 376-23. A
slightly revised Senate bill, S. 558, was adopted on August 2, 1988, by a vote of 94-3. The
revised version was passed in the House on August 8, 1988 and signed into law by President
Reagan on September 13, 1988, to become effective 180 days thereafter.
13. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3604-3607 (West Supp. 1989). Although the statute uses the term
"handicapped," many view this terminology as offensive, given its historical derivation.
14. See id. § 3604(f)(2) & (3).
15. See id. § 3607(b).
16. For a discussion of some of the issues raised by these new prohibitions, see Note, supra
note 9; Milstein, Pepper & Rubenstein, What The Fair HousingAmendmentsAct of 1988 Means
for People with Mental Disabilities 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 128 (1989); C.R. Feldblum, FAIR
HousING AMENDMENTS ACr OF 1988 (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1989) (ad-
dressing coverage for people with AIDS and HIV infection); Note, The Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988: A Critical Analysis of "Familial Status", 54 Mo. L. REv. 393 (1989).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
18. See, eg., Black Wins $40,000 Under Stiff Housing Law, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1989, at
Al, col. 2; Leuck, The New Teeth in the Fair Housing Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 10, at
1, col. 2; House Backs Move to Strengthen Enforcement of Housing Rights, N.Y. Times, June
30, 1988, at A20, col. 1; Housing Law: A Wooden Sword, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1988, at A26,
col. 1.
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nism for expeditious resolution of bias complaints. However, since the Act's
procedures are largely without precedent, the ramifications of certain innova-
tive provisions are untested by experience or judicial construction. This Arti-
cle will explore some of these potential ramifications and suggest strategies to
ensure that the promise of effective enforcement is fully realized. This Article
is intended primarily to assist those representing litigants in housing discrimi-
nation matters to negotiate the procedural choices provided by the Act. Part I
outlines the statutory provisions governing the two routes of enforcement, ad-
ministrative proceedings and federal court actions, and compares their relative
advantages and disadvantages. Part II examines two critical junctures in the
newly created administrative enforcement route that may detract from its ef-
fectiveness as a speedy and inexpensive method of dispute resolution. The first
has to do with provisions for determination by the agency as to whether rea-
sonable cause exists to believe that a violation has occurred or is about to
occur19 - from which springs determination of the agency's duty to prosecute
the claim. The second considers the election process whereby either party
may remove an agency proceeding to federal court.2 0 This section suggests
strategies for minimizing risks to efficient enforcement posed by these win-
dows of discretion and choice. Finally, Part III considers the extent to which
the provision for referral of claims to "substantially equivalent" state and local
agencies 2l significantly delays the actual implementation of the Act, and rec-
ommends ways of guarding against this result.
I.
THE INITIAL CHOICE: AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
OR FEDERAL COURT
Given the structure of the FHAA, the decision whether to litigate a claim
of housing discrimination before the agency or before the federal court in-
volves at least three major considerations: availability of relief, control and
expense of prosecution, and concerns of expedition. In making this decision,
litigants will tread largely uncharted territory. Prior to the 1988 amendments,
federal court was the only alternative under the statute in the event agency
efforts at voluntary conciliation failed. Now, complainants can achieve an ad-
judicatory resolution of their claims in either of two forums. In order to ex-
amine the ramifications of the choice, an understanding of the different
procedures in each forum is necessary.
A. Federal Court Actions
The provisions of the FHAA governing federal court actions do not sub-
stantially change the structure of the 1968 Act. Rather, the drafters' intent
was to remove some of the perceived disincentives to private enforcement that
19. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(g) (West Supp. 1989).
20. See id. § 3612(a).
21. See id. § 3610(f).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XVII:755
FAIR HOUSING STRATEGIES
previously existed: a short statute of limitations, and limitations on punitive
damages and attorney's fees.' Other changes, discussed below, codify expan-
sive judicial interpretations of the 1968 Act.3
First, the amendments explicitly provide that the federal right of action
exists independent of the administrative process, and that administrative ex-
haustion is not required.24 The provision of the 1968 Act permitting a post-
ponement of the civil action if the court believed that conciliation efforts were
"likely" to result in a settlement is eliminated.' This concept of two in-
dependent procedural routes of enforcement is further highlighted by the
Act's failure to mandate an initial election of remedies. The amendments pro-
vide that a civil action may not be commenced if an administrative law judge
has begun a "hearing on the record" regarding the same claim.3 Thus, one
unusual feature of the statute results from the converse of this section: the
filing of a federal action during the pendency of an administrative proceeding
is permitted up until the time of hearing. The Act also allows for the adminis-
trative proceeding to go forward while a federal court action is pending, but
halts the agency enforcement if a trial begins. 7 These two provisions are
designed to prevent multiple adjudications, according to FHAA's legislative
history,2" but they seem to invite simultaneous commencement of proceedings
in the two forums. The strategy ramifications of this possibility are discussed
in Part II.
Judicially created standing rules are also codified under the amendments.
The statute now speaks of "aggrieved parties," defined to include those who
believe another person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice,2 9
rather than "plaintiffs." The intent of this change is to incorporate the
Supreme Court's Havens Realty decision, broadly interpreting Title VIII to
give standing to "testers."3 Presumably, fair housing organizations and non-
22. The Judiciary Committee stated that "[a]lthough private enforcement has achieved
success in a limited number of cases, its impact is restricted by the lack of private resources, and
is hampered by a short statute of limitations, and disadvantageous limitations on punitive dam-
ages and attorney's fees." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
23. See, eg., infra notes 29, 31, 34 & 43 and accompanying text.
24. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989). This section provides that a civil
action may be commenced whether or not an administrative complaint has been filed and
"without regard to the status of any such complaint," unless a conciliation agreement has been
reached. An action may also be brought to enforce the terms of a conciliation agreement. The
FHAA thus eliminates the provisions of the 1968 Act which required a party to refrain from
bringing a civil action for 30 days after the filing of an administrative complaint. See 1968 Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3610(d).
25. See id. § 3612(a).
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
27. See id. § 3612(f). In addition, the agency may not issue a charge if a trial has com-
menced. Id. § 3610(g).
28. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 37, 39.
29. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602()(2) (West Supp. 1989); see also Baxter v. City of Belleville,
720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. M11. 1989) (developer had standing under FHAA to seek injunction
against discrimination against persons with AIDS, even though he did not have the disease
himself).
30. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 23. The Report specifically refers to Havens
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minority community residents, already given standing under Havens Realty
and earlier Supreme Court decisions, are similarly included within the new
definition.31 A final example of the drafters' efforts to codify liberal construc-
tion of Title VIII is found in the addition of the term "affirmative action" to
the list of appropriate forms of relief in the section governing private enforce-
ment. 2 While the legislative history of the Act does not directly address what
is intended by this term, the Judiciary Committee noted that the amendment
contemplates the continuation of the type of relief provided under current
law. 3 Some lower courts have required the adoption of temporary plans to
increase minority representation after finding Title VIII violations.34 The
amendments appear to confirm judicial discretion and flexibility in fashioning
remedies for violations of the Act.35
In the minds of the drafters, the most significant change in the private
enforcement realm is the elimination of the statute's $1,000 cap on punitive
damages.36 The Judiciary Committee considered this limit to be a "major im-
pediment to imposing an effective deterrent on violators and a disincentive" to
suits. 37 This premise is open to question, however. Before the amendments,
the cap could be effectively neutralized in most cases by the joinder of a claim
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), in which the Court permitted "tester" actions.
See also 24 C.F.R. § 100.80(G)(5) (1989); 54 Fed. Reg. 3238 (January 23, 1989) (preamble to
regulations).
31. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (minority and
white residents had standing to challenge racial steering); Heights Community Congress v. Hill-
top Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986) (non-profit
corporation organized to promote city as integrated community had standing to sue real estate
agents for housing discrimination); Project Basic Tenants Union v. Rhode Island Housing and
Mortg., 636 F. Supp. 1453 (D.R.I. 1986) (tenants union had standing to sue in an action for
Fair Housing Act violations).
32. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The 1968 Act provided that a court
could order "such affirmative action as may be appropriate" subject to the provisions of Section
3612, which referred only to injunctive relief and damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1982), amended
by 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610 (West Supp. 1989). Thus, the addition of the term "affirmative action"
to Section 3613, the successor to Section 3612, might be viewed simply as a clarification.
33. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 39. An amendment to prohibit affirmative action
was rejected by the House. 134 CONG. REc. H4902-08 (daily ed. June 29, 1988).
34. See, e.g., Gresham v. Windrish Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 882 (1984); Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973);
Young v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Burney v. Housing Authority, 551 F.
Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
35. The Second Circuit recently invalidated permanent quotas and the Supreme Court
refused to hear the matter. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert,
denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988). In the Starrett case, however, the court acknowledged the legiti-
macy of quotas as temporary remedial measures. See Note, The Legality of Integration Mainte-
nance Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced Housing, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 197 (1989). For
discussion of the complex issues raised by affirmative action in the Title VIII context, see gener-
ally Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Con-
trols, 26 STAN. L. RV. 245 (1974); Rabinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the
American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74
Nw. U.L. REv. 49 (1979).
36. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 40. Compare 1968 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c).
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 40.
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under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982 with a Title VIII claim, thus making full puni-
tive damages available." The removal of the cap, therefore, might be viewed
as more a symbolic gesture than a serious effort to encourage private action.39
The same qualification applies to the changes in the provision for awards of
attorney's fees. The 1968 Act allowed for awards only to prevailing plaintiffs
unable to afford private counsel,' but this limitation could be circumvented
since Section 1982 claims are covered by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 1976, which has no income qualification.4 1 The amendments conform Title
VIII to the typical civil rights fee shifting provision, which permits awards to
either party regardless of ability to pay. In one sense, however, this change
could be read as discouraging private enforcement, since it allows for the pos-
sibility of awards to prevailing defendants. The impact of potential defendant
awards should be negligible, however, since the joinder of Section 1982 claims
already presented this risk. In addition, it is likely that courts will apply a
very restrictive standard, as they have in other civil rights contexts, permitting
awards only when the plaintiff's claims are found to be frivolous.42
Two other changes in the private enforcement scheme are noteworthy.
The amendments lengthen the statute of limitations for commencement of an
action from 180 days to two years, and toll the period during the pendency of
administrative proceedings.43 Of course, the short filing deadline in the origi-
38. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Fountila v. Carter,
571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Adams, 625 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. IlM. 1985).
39. In most individual cases, a Section 1982 claim is usually available because there is
discriminatory intent. Joinder of claims becomes problematic only when discriminatory intent,
which may be required under Section 1982, is difficult to show. "Disparate impact" cases, in
which a neutral policy is alleged to have a discriminatory effect, have been held cognizable
under Title VIII. See, eg., Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d
983 (4th Cir. 1984); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The FHAA does not address the
validity of disparate impact analysis, but can be seen as intended by its proponents as an implicit
endorsement of the doctrine. However, when President Reagan signed the bill, he stated that
the Act should be read as requiring proof of intent. Senator Kennedy moved to correct this
attempt at a post hoc statutory construction of legislative history by stating on the Senate floor
that Congress intended no such requirement. 134 CONG. REC. S12,449 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1988).
On the other hand, Section 1982 does not bar discrimination on the basis of sex. See Lee v.
Minnock, 417 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); Raether v.
Phillip, 401 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Va. 1975). However, with regard to national origin, the stat-
ute covers persons who would have been considered members of distinct races in the mid-19th
century. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (fees awarded only if plaintiff is "not financially able to assume
said attorney's fees"); see Keith v. Volpe, 644 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 858 F.2d
467 (9th Cir. 1988).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see also Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983);
Oliver v. Foster, 524 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
42. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC. 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Ellis v.
Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The FHAA defines "prevailing party" by reference to
Section 1988. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(o) (West Supp. 1989).
43. Compare 1968 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), with FHAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a). The
FHAA also acknowledges the concept of a continuing violation: the two-year period runs, as
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nal Act had not applied to Section 1982 claims, which carry with them the
applicable state statute of limitations, which is generally at least two years.
44
Finally, the statute provides a new right of intervention by the Attorney Gen-
eral in cases of "general public importance," which allows for the imposition
of substantial civil penalties in addition to the plaintiff's actual and punitive
damages.45
B. Administrative Proceedings
Compared to the changes in private enforcement, which are somewhat
less than revolutionary given the availability of Section 1982 claims, the ad-
ministrative resolution mechanism of the FHAA is truly a new creation. Only
two features of the original statute are retained: the requirement that the
agency first attempt conciliation,"4 and the requirement that complaints ini-
tially be referred to state and local agencies certified as "substantially
equivalent" by HUD.' 7 This latter provision is particularly significant, in that
the administrative process outlined below will not be available to many com-
plainants until 1992: forty months from the date the amendments were en-
acted,48 the period of time given to previously certified state and local agencies
to bring their laws and practices into equivalence with the FHAA. The prob-
lematic nature of this grandfathering provision is discussed in Part III; the
following description of administrative proceedings assumes that the com-
plaint is considered at the federal level.
The process begins with the filing of a complaint by either an aggrieved
person,49 or the HUD Secretary upon her own initiative, with the statute of
limitations for filing extended from 180 days to one year.50 The agency is
courts had previously held the 180-day period to have run, from the "occurrence or termina-
tion" of the practice, or from the breach of a conciliation agreement, whichever occurs last. Id.;
see, eg., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); United States v. City of Parma,
Ohio, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
44. See, eg., Kittrell v. City of Rockwall, 526 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 925 (1976); Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
821 (1970).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(e) (West Supp. 1989). This section authorizes the award of civil
penalties applicable to "pattern or practice" cases: up to $50,000 for a first violation, and to
$100,000 for a subsequent violation. See id. § 3614(d). The FHAA leaves intact the Attorney
General's independent right to commence an action based on "pattern and practice" or raising
issues of "general public importance." Id. § 3614(a). Since there is no change in the law in this
respect, independent Justice Department litigation is not addressed in this Article.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3609 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
47. Such certification exists "[w]herever a state or local fair housing law provides rights
and remedies... which are substantially equivalent to [those] provided by [the FHAA]." Id.
§ 3610(c).
48. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
49. The same statutory definition of "aggrieved person" applies in administrative and
court proceedings. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(i) (West Supp. 1989), which includes in the defini-
tion anyone who claims to have been an aggrieved person. See also supra note 29; Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1989). Continuing violations are recog-
nized here as well as in federal court actions. See also supra note 43.
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required to complete an investigation of the complaint within 100 days, unless
"impracticable,"51 and in that event, she must inform the parties of the rea-
sons therefor. 2 During this period, conciliation is attempted,5" and the
agency must prepare an investigative report which is available to the parties.
Also within the 100 day period, the agency must make a determination as to
"whether reasonable cause exists" to believe that discrimination has occurred.
This time limit is also subject to the impracticability exception, which requires
a statement of reasons.55 In the event no cause is found, the complaint is
dismissed with public disclosure of that action. 6 Upon a finding of reasonable
cause, the agency must "immediately" begin prosecution with the service of a
charge on the respondent." Along with the charge is served a notice of elec-
tion: either the complainant or the respondent may, within twenty days,
choose to proceed by way of civil action.5" In that event, the Attorney Gen-
eral must commence the action in federal district court within thirty days.5 9
The aggrieved party may intervene as of right and seek the same remedies as
available under the private right of action.60 Whether or not the aggrieved
party intervenes, however, she is entitled to monetary relief.61 If no federal
court election is made, an administrative law judge [hereinafter ALJ] must
51. The FHAA, by not defining the term, has left the determination of what is "impracti-
cable" up to the Secretary.
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(a)(1)(B)iv), (C) (West Supp. 1989).
53. Id. § 3610(b)(1), (5). Conciliation agreements are to be made public unless the parties
and the agency agree otherwise. Id. § 3610(b)(4). If the agency has reasonable cause to believe
that a conciliation agreement has been breached, it must refer the matter to the Attorney Gen-
eral, with a recommendation that an action for enforcement be brought under the § 3614 proce-
dures that provide for civil penalties. Id. §§ 3610(c), 3614; see also infra notes 55-60 and
accompanying text. The Attorney General apparently has discretion over whether to file suit;
Section 3614 says only that she "may" commence such an action.
54. The investigative report includes statements and a summary of witness contacts, a
summary description of other records, and answers to interrogatories. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3610(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1989). HUD must provide both the report and the underlying
information to the parties upon their request. Id. § 3610(d)(2). Such a change can open the
administrative enforcement process to more effective participation by the aggrieved party.
55. Id. § 3610(g)(1). HUD has divided responsibility for investigative and prosecutorial
functions within the agency. The Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing is responsible for the
investigatory phase, while the General Counsel is delegated authority over reasonable cause
determinations and prosecution. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3258 (1989) (preamble to regulations) (codi-
fied at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100-146 (1989)).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(g)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
57. Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A). If reasonable cause is found on a complaint involving zoning or
land use law, the matter is referred to the Attorney General for action under the § 3614 proce-
dure. Id. § 3610(g)(2)(C). Thus, when the Justice Department chooses to exercise its discretion
and enforce a complaint, such a claim will be litigated in federal court.
58. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3610(h), 3612(a) (West Supp. 1989). Section 3612 also allows for elec-
tion by an aggrieved party on whose behalf a complaint was filed. This provision seems to
apply, for example, to the situation in which a complaint is filed by a fair housing organization
on behalf of an individual. Also, the "complainant" would include the Secretary for complaints
fied on her own initiative. See id. § 3602(j).
59. Id. § 3612(o)(1).
60. Id. § 3612(o)(2).
61. Id. § 3612(o).
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conduct an "on the record" hearing, governed by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, with intervention permitted by the aggrieved party.6 2 Discovery may
be conducted, as "expeditiously and inexpensively" as possible.13 The hearing
must be commenced within 120 days of the issuance of the charge and a deci-
sion issued sixty days after its conclusion." Again, the agency must justify
any determination that these time limits are "impracticable." 6
The ALJ may order appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief, ac-
tual damages, and civil penalties varying from $10,000 for a first offense to
$50,000 for repeat offenders." The ALJ decision may be reviewed by the Sec-
retary within thirty days, after which time it becomes final.67 An aggrieved
party may seek judicial review of the final order in a court of appeals within
thirty days, or the agency may petition for enforcement within sixty days, also
in the circuit court." If neither occurs, any person entitled to relief may peti-
tion without time limit for a decree enforcing the order, which may be issued
by the circuit court clerk. 9 Both the ALJ and the reviewing court are author-
ized to award attorney's fees to the prevailing parties, other than the
government.7°
At any time after the filing of a charge, the agency may authorize the
Attorney General to bring a civil action for temporary relief, and the Attorney
General is required to commence the action "promptly." Such an action does
not affect the continuation of the administrative proceedings. 71 If, however,
an aggrieved party has filed a private action in state or federal court concern-
ing the same claim, the commencement of a trial in that action halts the ad-
ministrative proceedings. The agency may not issue a charge under these
circumstances.72 If a charge has already been issued, the AUJ is directed to
62. Id. §§ 3612(b), (c); see also Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7, & 8, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554, 556, 557 (1988) (governing "on the record" hearings).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The Secretary is empowered to issue
subpoenas during both the investigatory and the hearing stages. Criminal penalties are pro-
vided for the failure of a witness to appear. Id. § 3611(c).
64. Id. § 3612(g)(1).
65. Id. § 3612(g)(2).
66. Id. § 3612(g)(3).
67. Id. § 3612(h)(1). The Secretary may affirm, modify, set aside or remand the initial
decision for further proceedings. 24 C.F.R. § 104.930 (1989).
68. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3612(i), (j) (West Supp. 1989). If review is not sought within 45 days,
the AI's findings are deemed conclusive in connection with a petition for enforcement. Id.
§ 3612(1). The statute creates a discrepancy in the filing deadlines at the appellate level. Peti-
tions for review must be filed within 30 days, but Section 3612(1) suggests a 45-day time limit.
HUD recognized the inconsistency but decided not to reconcile it because the time limits were
statutorily specified. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3270 (1989).
69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3612(m), (n) (West Supp. 1989).
70. Id. § 3610(e)(1) & § 3612(p). Fees to a party who has prevailed against the govern-
ment are awarded under the Equal'Access to Justice Act, which limits hourly rates to $75,
absent special circumstances, and requires a showing that the agency position was not "substan-
tially justified." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
72. Id. § 3610(g)(4).
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discontinue the proceedings.73
The scheme described above presumes that HUD retains the complaint.
When the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of a certified state or local
agency, it must be referred to that agency. HUD has no further involvement,
unless the certified agency fails to commence proceedings within thirty days,
does not carry forward the proceedings with "reasonable promptness," or the
Secretary determines that the agency no longer qualifies for certification.74
Certification by the Secretary requires "substantially equivalent" substantive
rights, procedures, remedies and judicial review. However, any agency certi-
fied prior to the passage of the amendments retains its status for forty months
after September 13, 1988.1s
C. Considerations in the Choice of Forum
In evaluating a litigant's choice between court and agency proceedings,
one concern is readily apparent from the complex statutory framework. The
concept of choice is, in a sense, illusory. Even if an aggrieved party chooses
the agency process, the respondent may remove the matter to federal court
under the election procedure. Of course, there is one significant difference
between a private action commenced in federal court, and a removed action:
in the former, the aggrieved party has the burden of prosecution; in the latter,
the burden rests with the agency. Nevertheless, the problem of delay in the
federal courts that the administrative process was designed to remedy is not
fully resolved under the FHAA because of the removal opportunity. Thus, it
should not be presumed that the choice by the aggrieved party of the agency
route will necessarily result in more rapid disposition.
Putting aside the question of election, which is addressed more fully in
Part H, there remain certain distinctive aspects of litigation in the two forums
that command attention. These relate to the availability of various forms of
relief and to control of the prosecution of the claim. First, punitive damages
are available only from the federal court. An ALl may award only actual
damages and civil penalties, the latter of which inures to the benefit of the
government, not the aggrieved party. Courts have generally interpreted actual
damages to include recovery for emotional distress and humiliation beyond
out-of-pocket expenses in Title VIII actions,76 but awards have not been gen-
73. Id. § 3612(f).
74. Id. § 3610(f). There are no certified agencies, as yet, for disability and familial status
claims; however, HUD has contracted with some agencies to conduct investigations and then
turn the files over to HUD. Letter from Harry L. Carey, Assistant General Counsel for Gen-
eral Law, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (March 26, 1990) [hereinafter HUD
correspondence] [on fie with Author].
75. Id. The certification does not appear to apply to claims relating to disability or family
status, however. See infra Part III.
76. See, eg., Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Steele v. Title
Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. In.
1977), aff'd 594 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
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erous. 7 7 Just as the limitation on punitive damages under the 1968 Act was
viewed as a disincentive to private enforcement, 78 the punitive damage bar in
agency proceedings may be an important consideration for litigants, to be bal-
anced against the advantages of government prosecution.
A second and similar distinction concerns the inclusion of "affirmative
action" in the types of relief that the federal court may grant and the absence
of that phrase in the description of remedies at an A.J's disposal. Whether
this was a purposeful exclusion is not apparent from the statute's legislative
history. Nevertheless, if a significant goal of litigation is the imposition of
quotas or preferences as a remedy for past acts of discrimination, the potential
roadblock posed by the administrative route can be avoided by the selection of
the judicial forum.
Finally comes the question of temporary relief, which in many housing
discrimination matters is of critical importance. A victim of discrimination in
a tight housing market may be primarily concerned with gaining a preliminary
injunction preventing the sale or rental of the property. Courts have not been
adverse to granting such relief,79 which, as a practical matter, often provokes
the settlement of the action. Of course, a preliminary injunction or restraining
order requires a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, and generally,
"testers" evidence will be critical. Litigation along these lines requires both
planning and quick action. While the administrative scheme provides for tem-
porary relief, the process is cumbersome, requiring agency referral of the mat-
ter to the Justice Department, which must then commence a federal action.
Moreover, there is no provision in the Act that mandates or even encourages
the use of testing in the agency investigation of complaints, and HUD has
taken the position that it will not engage in or seek out and contract with
private agencies to do testing in connection with its investigatory process. 80
Thus, given these two limitations on HUD's powers, there is cause for concern
as to whether preliminary relief will be widely available through the adminis-
trative process.81
77. See Kushner, supra note 8, at 1076-78; see also Schwemm, supra note 8, at 380. For a
complete listing of damage awards, see J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN
REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION at app. 9-1 (Supp. 1989).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
79. See, e.g., Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Baxter v. City of
Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989). Baxter, the first reported decision applying the
FHAA, affirms the availability of such relief, as well as the broad principle of standing, dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 29-3 1.
80. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3263 (1989). In addition, HUD regulations require that before the
agency makes a referral for preliminary relief, it must "consult" with the Justice Department.
24 C.F.R. § 103.500(a) (1989). This provision has been criticized as creating additional oppor-
tunity for delay, but HUD views the consultation requirement as encouraging expeditious appli-
cations. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3269-70 (1989).
81. Despite the apparent unwieldiness of the preliminary relief process, it appears that the
Justice Department has efficiently processed those claims received from HUD so far. Between
March 12, 1989, the FHAA's effective date, and January 22, 1990, the Justice Department was
referred eight matters for "prompt judicial action" and has obtained temporary restraining or-
der relief in six. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOJ FAIR HOUSING AcT CASE ACTIVITY SINCE
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Another consideration in the choice of forum relates to control and ex-
pense of prosecution. The judicial route requires an aggrieved party to obtain
counsel, 82 who will typically rely primarily on compensation through the stat-
ute's fee shifting provision. The contingent nature of compensation, which
requires some measure of success in the litigation, limits the pool of attorneys
willing to take on Title VIII and other civil rights actions. The administrative
scheme, on the other hand, holds out the possibility of prosecution completely
at agency expense. Liberal intervention provisions permit an aggrieved party
to retain some measure of control over the process, but also may necessitate
the assistance of counsel. In the event that this course is pursued, however,
there is a question concerning compensation for the intervenor's attorney.
Prevailing parties in the administrative process - including intervenors - are
entitled to reasonable fee awards.8 3 However, HUD has indicated that the
reasonableness of a fee award to a prevailing intervenor must be evaluated as a
question of fact by the ALJ, given the participation of federal attorneys, con-
sidering factors such as the appropriateness, necessity and effectiveness of the
work performed.' Thus, there exists the possibility that decision makers will
view the work of an intervenor's attorney as redundant and unnecessary. In
the context of Section 1988 fee applications, courts have carefully scrutinized
the intervenor's role before awarding fees to insure that the intervenor has
contributed significantly to the favorable outcome."5 If this view takes hold
and the likelihood of fee shifting becomes more uncertain, aggrieved parties,
unable to afford the cost of private counsel, will be required to cede complete
control of the prosecution to the government if they pursue the administrative
route. If, however, the fee award provisions are interpreted liberally to en-
courage participation of aggrieved parties, it may be easier for housing dis-
crimination victims to obtain counsel. Attorneys concerned with the
contingent nature of awards, dependent upon success in the litigation, may be
encouraged to take on representation because of the agency's initial determi-
nation that "reasonable cause" exists. 6
MARCH 12, 1989 (Jan. 22, 1990). However, since this record represents a processing rate of less
than one claim per month, it cannot serve as much of an indicator as to the efficiency of a fully
operating system.
82. The statute provides that the court may appoint counsel upon application of either the
plaintiff or the defendant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(b) (West Supp. 1989). But the court cannot
compel an attorney to represent a party. See Mallard v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
83. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3612(c), (p) (West Supp. 1989).
84. 54 Fed. Reg. 3274-75 (1989) (preamble to regulations). The regulations provide that
prevailing intervenors should receive fees unless "special circumstances" make recovery unjust.
24 C.F.R. § 104.940(6) (1989).
85. See ECOS, Inc. v. Brinegar, 671 F. Supp. 381, 386-88 (LD.N.C 1987); see also Amer-
ican Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 650 F. Supp. 324, 331-33 (S.D. Ind. 1986).
86. Under the statute, intervenors run the risk of being responsible for paying prevailing
respondent's attorney's fees. However, HUD regulations permit such awards only if the inter-
venor's participation was "frivolous or vexatious, or was for the purpose of harassment." 24
C.F.R. § 104.940 (1989). Cf. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732
(1989) (same result under Title VII).
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II.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: A CLOSER LOOK
Despite limitations on relief and the possible loss of control over prosecu-
tion, the FHAA administrative process remains a very attractive enforcement
mechanism for a victim of discrimination who seeks the resolution of his claim
with a minimum investment of time, money and effort. It was Congress' ex-
pectation in enacting the statute that the administrative process would become
the primary and preferred means of enforcement 8 7 Whether this expectation
is fulfilled will rest in large part on the diligence and vigorousness of HUD's
investigative and prosecutorial efforts. Even at this early juncture in the stat-
ute's history, however, there is some cause for concern about the efficacy of
the administrative route, arising out of HUD's interpretation of and proce-
dures relating to the "reasonable cause" finding as set forth in its recently
promulgated regulations."8 In addition, the election process by which agency
proceedings may be removed to federal court may render the administrative
route substantially less advantageous than anticipated by Congress.89 This
section explores these two issues, and suggests strategies for bolstering the in-
herent benefits of the administrative scheme.
A. The Reasonable Cause Determination
The entire federal enforcement effort established by the FHAA is contin-
gent on a finding of "reasonable cause." A finding of cause virtually requires
the institution of adjudicatory proceedings, while a negative determination
leaves the aggrieved party with only her private right of action in federal
court. Given the importance of the determination, controls on agency con-
duct are of utmost importance. HUD regulations governing this stage of the
process seem designed to maximize its discretion, however, rather than to en-
sure efficient and accurate determinations.
First, HUD's investigative procedures seem to provide for substantially
greater input and control by the respondent than by the complainant. The
regulations permit the agency to utilize formal discovery methods - deposi-
87. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
88. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (1989). The FHAA required HUD to issue regulations, after
notice and comment, not later than March 12, 1989. See Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619,
§ 13(a) (1988). Proposed rules were published on November 7, 1988, and more than 6,000
comments were received. 54 Fed. Reg. 3234 (1989). The final rules, issued on January 23, and
effective March 12, were not substantially modified with regard to procedural issues, although
some of the concerns expressed in this Article were raised by commentators.
89. Early statistical information appears to bear out the concerns voiced here. In the Act's
first 11 months, well over one thousand complaints were filed with HUD. Only approximately
229 complaints were investigated and referred to the General Counsel's office. HUD Corre-
spondence, supra note 74. Of those, there were 24 determinations of "reasonable cause" and
106 of no "reasonable cause." Most of the remainder were "pending a determination." Id. Of
the 24 complaints that HUD agreed to prosecute, nine are simply separate counts, filed by
multiple complainants, against one respondent, id., leaving a total of 15 cases actually prose-
cuted. And in eight of these prosecutions, a party has elected to remove to federal court. Ap-
proximately half of these cases were removed at the election of the complainant. Id.
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tions, interrogatories, and requests for production and admissions - during
the initial investigatory period, as well as during the pre-administrative hear-
ing stage. In the 100-day investigatory period, however, while the respondent
is given the same rights as the agency, no access to the discovery process is
provided to the aggrieved party.9 Thus, for example, a respondent could take
the deposition of or serve interrogatories on the complainant, while the com-
plainant must rely solely on the agency to establish reasonable cause, and can-
not independently gather information through formal channels. HUD's
position with regard to this disequilibrium is that a respondent should be per-
mitted to obtain information in its own defense, while the complaining party,
by choosing the administrative rather than the judicial route, "places the con-
duct of the investigation in HUD's hands." 91 The agency suggests that an
aggrieved party who wants independent discovery can obtain it by filing a civil
action.92 This view of the investigatory process seems unnecessarily to preju-
dice the complainant in this crucial first stage,93 and to run counter to the
congressional intent of encouraging administrative resolution. HUD perceives
its role to be that of a neutral fact finder at this stage.94 Neutrality would seem
to be best served by permitting discovery to both or neither of the parties. The
denial of discovery rights to complainants makes careful monitoring of HUD
investigatory efforts a necessity.
A second troubling aspect of the reasonable cause determination process
relates to HUD's definition of cause. The regulations indicate that the deter-
mination will be made "based solely on the totality of factual circumstances,"
and the agency "shall consider whether the facts... are sufficient to warrant
the initiation of a civil action in Federal Court.' 95  While this language ap-
pears to suggest a Rule 11 standard, 96 the agency's commentary to the regula-
tions indicates that its view of reasonable cause in fact may be more
restrictive.97 Both the HUD commentary and Rule 11 require that the com-
plaint be "well-grounded in the facts." 98 However, under the commentary,
90. 24 C.F.R. § 103.215(G) (1989); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 104.500-.580 (1989) (governing
the conduct of discovery). In addition, the requirement that the agency "seek voluntary cooper-
ation" in obtaining documents and statements in the fist instance may provide an opportunity
for a recalcitrant respondent to slow down the administrative process at its earliest stage. 24
C.F.R. § 103.215(a) (1989).
91. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3263 (1989).
92. Id.
93. Another problem with this provision is that it allows for the intimidation of complain-
ants through abuse of the discovery process. HUD does not provide legal representation to an
aggrieved party confronted with discovery requests. See HUD correspondence, supra note 74.
The need to obtain counsel at this stage, or to appear unrepresented at a deposition, for exam-
pie, might cause an aggrieved party to withdraw her claim.
94. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3263 (1989) ("While HUD is neutral with respect to the parties, the
parties' positions are not equal").
95. 24 C.F.R. § 103.400 (1989).
96. See FED. L CI. P. 11.
97. The proportion of cases finding no reasonable cause seems to suggest that a rigid view
is being applied. See supra note 89.
98. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 54 Fed. Reg. 3267 (1989).
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cause requires conduct that "appears to constitute a violation of the Act,"
while Rule 11 permits complaints where there exists "a good faith argument"
for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.99 While the language
of the regulation would prevail over the commentary, the agency's comments
nevertheless are worrisome, particularly for those complainants who are as-
serting novel claims of discrimination on the basis of disability or family sta-
tus, areas in which what constitutes a violation of the Act has not yet been
judicially defined.
A third issue concerning the reasonable cause determination is its appeal-
ability. HUD takes the position that no right of appeal is contemplated by the
statute, 10° and suggests that the private right of action provides a sufficient
substitute.101 It seems likely, however, that this issue will find its way to the
courts. Under general principles of administrative law, preclusion of judicial
review of agency action is disfavored. 2 A presumption in favor of review
governs unless a contrary intent is explicitly stated in the statute, is "fairly
discernible in the statutory scheme,"103 or unless the "agency action is com-
99. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 54 Fed. Reg. 3267 (1989).
100. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3268 (1989). The evidence upon which HUD relies is not particu-
larly convincing. HUD cites the statutory direction that complaints be "promptly dismissed"
upon a finding of no reasonable cause, the failure to provide specifically for review, and the
general goal of expeditious resolution which finds support in the FHAA's legislative history.
101. Id. ("HUD notes that the failure to provide for the review of the reasonable cause
determination will not preclude an aggrieved person from filing a civil action...").
102. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In Bowen, the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment of the Secretary of Health and Human Services that Part B of Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act (The Medicare Act) precludes judicial review. The Court held that preclusion of
judicial review must be clearly and convincingly articulated by Congress. The "clear and con-
vincing" standard was evoked by the Court to reject the Secretary's arguments that the Medi-
care Act implicitly precluded judicial review of Part B of the Act by explicitly providing for
review of actions under Part A, and remaining silent on judicial review of actions under Part B.
The Bowen standard derives directly from Abbott Laboratories, in which the Court rejected
the Food and Drug Administration's assertion that pre-enforcement review of administrative
regulations is precluded by lack of ripeness. Justice Harlan maintained that since the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act endorses the basic presumption of review, the courts must require a clear
and convincing showing of evidence of a contrary legislative intent to restrict review. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 140.
103. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157
(1970); see also Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984). In Ass'n of Data
Processing Service Organizations, a data processing organization brought suit against the comp-
troller of currency challenging his ruling that banks could offer data processing services. The
Court held that judicial review of the comptroller's action was not barred by the APA unless
(1) statutorily precluded or (2) the action is committed to agency discretion by law. The Court
read the first exception to the presumption of judicial review to mean either a specific expression
by Congress of intent to preclude review or a fairly discernible purpose for withholding review
found in the statutory scheme. These expressions must meet the "clear and convincing" stan-
dard articulated in Abbott. After interpreting the relevant statutes, the Court held that the suit
was not precluded. 397 U.S. at 158.
In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, the Court used the same reasoning to reach the
opposite result. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court decided that allowing a con-
sumer group to sue the Secretary of Agriculture over the price of certain types of milk would
"severely disrupt this complex and delicate administrative scheme." Block v. Community Nu-
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mitted to agency discretion by law.""°
The FHAA contains no explicit exclusion; rather, the statute is silent on
the subject of whether reasonable cause determinations are subject to review.
Whether an intent to preclude review is discernible from the statutory scheme
as a whole is a close question, and in recent years the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in this area have evidenced a certain indeterminacy."' 5 Courts might
find that the statute's specific allowance of review following an administrative
hearing and the private right of action create a clear structure for expeditious
resolution of complaints that would be disturbed by still another level of judi-
cial involvement. However, given the substantial distinctions between agency
prosecution dictated by a finding of cause, and individual federal court pro-
ceedings, it may be that the courts will find that the overall scheme does not
rise to the level of "clear and convincing evidence" of a congressional intent to
preclude review."°6 The resolution of the issue may become case-specific, de-
pending largely on whether there develops a sense that HUD's determinations
in fact appear arbitrary or ill-founded.
The final exception to the presumption of review relates to agency discre-
tion. Courts are not always willing to review agency actions that fall within
the scope of prosecutorial discretion,107 but the availability of review will turn
on how much discretion the agency is deemed to have actually been afforded
trition Institute, 467 U.S. at 348. Justice O'Connor found that the "clear and convincing"
standard was flexible enough to allow an inquiry into whether granting review would frustrate
the meaning of the statute. Id. at 351. The statute involved in Block regulated milk prices
between producers and handlers. The statute made no mention of consumer participation. In
the eyes of the Court, allowing such participation would provide a way for handlers of milk to
bypass the administrative remedies set forth in the statute by suing in their capacity as consum-
ers. Id. at 352. Thus, the Court found a preclusion of consumer claims fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme. Id. at 351-52.
104. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1966); see also Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (very narrow construction of the "com-
mitted to agency discretion" exception). Volpe concerned the Secretary of Transportations
decision to run a highway through a national park. The Court held that the exception to the
APA right of judicial review for acts committed to agency discretion is only applicable in those
instances where there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. at 410 (citing S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). The Court interpreted the
statute involved to limit the Secretary's discretion in ways that were judicially enforceable. Id.
at 410-13. Thus, it remanded the case for determination whether the Secretary's choice was the
only "feasible and prudent" alternative, the legal standard specified the statute. Id. at 420.
105. Compare Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (suggesting a
searching inquiry into the statutory structure and goals) with Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1984) (reiterating a strong presumption against preclusion
unless explicitly stated).
106. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 141.
107. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Heckler, the Court held that it could
not review the Food and Drug Administration's refusal to take action against states that used
drugs to inflict capital punishment by lethal injection. The Court used language contained in
the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988), to create a presumption
against judicial review of agency refusal to take prosecutorial action. Since an agency must use
its particular expertise to determine whether a violation has actually occurred and a refusal to
act is not an exercise of "coercive power over an individual's right to liberty or property,"
whether or not to prosecute was presumed to be a matter left to agency discretion. Id. at 831-
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in its decision making. When agency decisions to prosecute are circumscribed
by "clearly defined factors," judicial review is appropriate.10 s If a decision is
left solely to the judgment of the agency, however, courts will typically find no
right to judicial review, on the theory that there is no legal standard upon
which to evaluate the propriety of the agency action. 1°9
Under the FHAA, HUD is not entitled to pick and choose among the
complaints it prosecutes. If HUD decides that there is reasonable cause, it
must commence proceedings. The real question thus relates to the standards
governing the cause finding. Here, the agency's enunciation of a Rule 11 stan-
dard1 10 suggests that judicial review may not be precluded under the "discre-
tionary" exception. Moreover, HUD has implied that it will not take into
consideration in "cause" findings such typical discretionary options of the
prosecutor as the anticipated amount of recovery, resource allocation, and
ease of prosecution."' Courts have become accustomed to utilizing the Rule
11 standard in litigation over sanctions or other relief,"' and may well find
that it sufficiently circumscribes the agency's discretion for review purposes.
Moreover, a court faced with an appeal from a reasonable cause assessment
would not be hindered by the lack of an administrative record to review. The
32. This presumption may be rebutted only if a substantive statute gives specific guidelines for
an agency to follow in the exercise of discretion. Id. at 833.
108. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), in which the Court found that the
Secretary of Labor must state reasons for his failure to challenge the results in the election for a
union officer. The Court held that the Secretary's refusal to prosecute was subject to judicial
review because the rationale (later expressed in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)) that
inaction did not affect individual rights did not apply in this case. For, in this instance, individ-
ual union members would be left without a remedy. Id. at 574-75. Thus, where the decision
whether to bring suit depends on a "rather straightforward factual determination and (there is]
nothing in the nature of that task that places the... decision 'beyond the judicial capacity to
supervise,' "judicial review may not be precluded. Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88 (3d
Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
109. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); see
also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). Webster illustrates that, in cases of constitutional
magnitude, there is always a legal standard upon which to evaluate agency action. Webster
reaffirms the Overton Park and Heckler decisions by allowing a covert agency technician for the
C.I.A., who was discharged because of his sexual orientation, to bring a constitutional claim
against the agency. 486 U.S. at 604. Although the decision as to whether to dismiss an em-
ployee was expressly left to the C.I.A. Director's discretion by the statute, the statute cannot
preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims based on an individual discharge. Id.
Thus, the Court reminds us in Webster that administrative agencies never have the discretion to
ignore constitutional guarantees, even in cases where their actions are statutorily unreviewable.
Similarly, where FHAA claims involve constitutional issues, judicial review must be
guaranteed.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
111. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3267 (1989). HUD has further stated that its intent is to base the
reasonable cause assessment solely on the facts, excluding consideration of "extraneous matters
not related to the factual determination of liability."
112. The question of standards under Rule 11 has engendered much scholarly attention.
See, e-g., Bloomenstein, Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 AKRON L. REv. 289 (1988); Grosberg, Illusion and
Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575 (1987);
Note, Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1988); Note, Plausible Plead-
ings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1987).
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requirement of a developed administrative record distinguishes the FHAA
from many administrative schemes.1 13 Not only must HUD prepare a written
investigative report under the statute;' 14 the regulations also provide that the
agency will issue "a short and plain written statement of the facts" upon
which it bases a determination of no cause.' 15 Thus, a reviewing court would
appear to have a sufficient record to determine whether the agency action was
arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion - the appropriate standard
of review under the Administrative Procedure Act.116
As the foregoing discussion implies, the question of judicial review at this
early stage is most significant when the agency finds against the complainant.
It is unlikely that a court would rule favorably on a claim for review by a
respondent from a determination that cause exists, because the agency action
is not final - the respondent may be absolved of liability in later administra-
tive or judicial proceedings - and there has been no exhaustion of reme-
dies.' 17 The complainant who receives a no cause determination, on the other
hand, is clearly without further recourse at the agency level; thus, issues of
finality and exhaustion are satisfied.
The fourth and final area of concern with regard to reasonable cause de-
terminations relates to the "impracticability" exception" 8 to the 100-day in-
vestigatory period.'19 Expeditious complaint processing is an obvious
advantage of the administrative scheme. The time limits statutorily provided
113. Even where the administrative scheme calls for informal action which does not gener-
ate a record or require the issuance of agency findings, it may still be advantageous for agency
decision-makers to issue findings, as illustrated by the decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). After holding that the statute in question limited the
Secretary of Transportation's discretion to allow highways to be constructed through national
parks, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, turned to the issue of the record necessary for
judicial review. Id. at 409. Because the agency was involved in informal adjudication in decid-
ing that there were no "feasibly prudent" alternatives to running a six-lane highway through
Overton Park, no formal findings were required by the APA. Id. at 417. In order to provide a
record on which the Court could review the decision, Justice Marshall recommended that the
administrative officials who participated in the decision testify and explain their action if they
did not voluntarily wish to submit written findings. Id. at 420. Thus, Justice Marshall skillfully
provided for the issuance of findings even in informal adjudications where judicial review is not
precluded by "clear and convincing" evidence found within the statute or statutory scheme.
Agency heads, rather than subject themselves to in-court examination of the basis for their
decisions, were prompted by the decision in Volpe to issue findings.
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(G)(5)(a) (West Supp. 1989).
115. 24 C.F.R. § 103.400 (1989).
116. 5 U.S.C § 706 (1988); see also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975) (where
there is no "clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to prohibit all judicial review
of [agency action] ... courts are [not] necessarily... without power or jurisdiction ... if it
should clearly appear that the [administrator] has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
117. See Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 449 U.S. 232, 236 (1980)
(FTC's issuance of a complaint after investigation was not "final agency action" warranting
judicial review); see also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be avoided by claim that NLRB com-
plaint is groundless and holding of an administrative hearing would cause irreparable damage).
118. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(IV) (West Supp. 1989). HUD appears to be interpreting
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at every stage contemplate final resolution at the agency level in less than one
year.12 Each such deadline, however, is qualified by an "impracticability"
exception. Despite this recognition by Congress of the realities of decision
making, the drafters designed two checks on the utilization of the exception.
First, in the event a deadline is not met, the agency must notify the parties in
writing of the reasons for the delay. Second, the agency must prepare an an-
nual report to Congress that tabulates the number of instances in the preced-
ing year in which investigations, reasonable cause determinations,
commencements of hearings, and issuances of decision did not meet the speci-
fied time limitations. 121 Neither of these provisions, however, will serve to
control agency delay given HUD's interpretation of "impracticability." The
agency has refused to define in its regulations the circumstances under which
it will invoke the exception, but has explicitly indicated that "demands upon
HUD's resources caused by other docketed cases" would be a legitimate con-
sideration. 122 If HUD uses backlog to excuse the statutory deadlines, the con-
trols on delay will stand a good chance of being rendered meaningless, and a
major advantage of the administrative scheme nullified. This risk is particu-
larly acute at the investigatory stage. Once there is a finding of reasonable
cause, delay in final resolution is at least mitigated, since an aggrieved party is
assured of prosecution at agency expense.
It could be argued that including resource availability in the interpreta-
tion of impracticability is contrary to the intent of the statute. The House
Judiciary Committee Report suggests that an extension of the 100-day investi-
gatory period is contemplated only in "exceptional" cases. 12  Thus, a more
reasonable interpretation of the statutory exception is that only factors pecu-
liar to a particular complaint - for example, difficulties in collecting informa-
tion or identifying witnesses, prolonged discovery, or the need for extensive
testimony - should excuse compliance with the time limitations. In the event
that a regular pattern of extensions becomes the norm in the administrative
process, consideration should be given to challenging the HUD interpretation
of the exception.
B. The "Election Procedure"
The most novel feature of the FHAA is the "election" procedure, by
which, after a finding of reasonable cause, either the aggrieved party or the
respondent may choose to have the claim prosecuted by HUD in federal court
this exception loosely. Investigations are not being completed within 100 days. See HUD cor-
respondence, supra note 74.
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610 (West Supp. 1989). The scheme allows 100 days for investigation
and reasonable cause determination, 120 days from issuance of the charge to commencement of
a hearing, 60 days for issuance of a decision, and 30 days for review by the Secretary - a total
of 310 days, not including actual hearing days.
121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3608(c)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
122. 54 Fed. Reg. 3265 (1989). See HUD correspondence, supra note 74.
123. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 33 (a section-by-section analysis).
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rather than before an AIJ.124 The original committee bill did not contain this
provision. 2 ' It allowed only for a private claim in federal court and for HUD
prosecution in the administrative level.' 26  The election was adopted by
amendment on the House floor proposed by Representative Hamilton Fish, 1 7
and in the Senate by Senator Edward Kennedy.1 21 Its purpose, made clear in
the congressional debates, 129 was to save the FHAA from being declared un-
constitutional as an abridgement of the seventh amendment's right to a jury
trial, and as a violation of Article III of the Constitution, which safeguards
litigants' rights to independent and impartial federal adjudication.
One area of constitutional concern surrounding the power of an ALl to
award actual damages and civil penalties arises from the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Curtis v. Loether.3° The Court in Curtis held that because Title VIII
conferred "legal" rights and remedies, as indicated by the allowance of com-
pensatory damages as well as equitable relief, the seventh amendment entitled
either party to a trial by jury.131 That the claim was created by statute, rather
than by common law, was not viewed as determinative since the claim in-
volved rights and remedies typical of actions at law.' 32 Curtis seemed to sug-
gest that Title VIII claims would require consideration in Article III courts.
However, several years later in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission,1 33 the Court held that administrative adjudication
of a government claim for a civil penalty did not violate the seventh amend-
ment. Congress was entitled to assign to agencies fact finding and "initial
adjudication" of claims created by statute. Thus, the constitutionality of the
delegation of adjudicative authority over Title VIII claims would depend on
whether the claim was private or public. The Curtis distinction between legal
124. The agency may also elect removal when a complaint is filed on the Secretary's own
initiative. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3610 (a)()(A)(i), 3612(a), (o) (West Supp. 1989); see also id. § 36020")
(stating that " '[c]omplainant' means the person (including the secretary) who files a complaint
under Section 3610 of the Title").
125. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 35-36 (section-by-section analysis).
126. A number of members of the House Judiciary Committee expressed reservations
about the bill on several grounds. First, they viewed adjudication by AIs as too controversial,
voicing the concerns of the National Association of Realtors that ALIJs would lack sufficient
independence from HUD. Second, they questioned the constitutionality of the delegation of
adjudicative power. Finally, they suggested that the administrative scheme was both inefficient,
in that enforcement petitions in the circuit court might create substantial delay, and inappropri-
ate, in that the jury system was more responsive to discrimination cases. Their proposal would
have given HUD authority to seek expedited emergency injunctive relief in the federal court,
with thejury's findings binding in a subsequent action for damages. See HousE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 69-79 (additional views of Messrs. Moorehead et al.).
127. 134 CONG. REC. H4679 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (the vote was 401-0).
128. 134 CONG. REc. S10454 (daily ed. August 1, 1988).
129. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S10460 (daily ed. August 1, 1988) (remarks of Senator
Hatch); 134 CONG. REC. H460 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (remarks of Representative Fish).
130. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
131. Id. at 192.
132. The Court saw Title VIII claims as most analogous to tort actions. Id. at 195.
133. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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and equitable remedies receded in significance.134 The opportunity for agency
adjudication raised by Atlas was called into question, in the view of some, by
the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Tull v. United States.135 In Tull, the
Court returned to the Curtis analysis, giving greater importance to the form of
relief than to the public/private distinction in determining the constitutional
necessity of a jury trial. It held that a jury trial is required to determine liabil-
ity when the government seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act because civil penalties are a common law form of relief, like
punitive damages. Tull can be read consistently with Atlas as not applying to
administrative proceedings. 136 The decision raised the concern, however, that
even if the initial delegation to an agency of adjudicative power under Title
VIII could survive a seventh amendment challenge, the government's attempt
to collect a civil penalty would necessitate the relitigation of the entire matter
before a federal court jury.
A second and related constitutional concern stems from the Supreme
Court's recent focus upon separation of powers doctrine. Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 1 37 seemed to signal the adoption
of a rigid view that the determination of "private rights" must be confined to
Article III courts. In that case, the Court declared unconstitutional the power
of bankruptcy judges to resolve contract claims. In several subsequent deci-
sions - particularly the Schor and Thomas cases - however, a majority of
the Court adopted a more functional approach to delegations of adjudicative
power based on an evaluation of the degree of incursion on the federal judici-
ary when Congress switches authority for resolution of a private claim from
an Article III to an Article I court.1 38 This balancing approach, however, has
created substantial uncertainty as to how much delegation will survive a con-
134. The Atlas Court specifically noted, although in dicta, that "even if the Seventh
Amendment would have required a jury" trial where the adjudication was assigned to a federal
court, Congress could delegate adjudication to an agency. Id. at 455.
135. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
136. See id. at 416 n.4. The Court suggested in a footnote that Atlas survives as authority
for the proposition that functional and practical considerations preclude the application of the
seventh amendment to administrative hearings.
137. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
138. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (allowing
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to adjudicate private state law counter-
claims in fraud adjudications actions heard by the commission). In Schor, Justice O'Connor
spoke for the Court when she emphasized the limited nature of the extension of jurisdiction to a
very small class of claims related to commodities. The convenience of having the commission
decide all the claims together far outweighed separation of power concerns and any prejudice
that might result from having private claims decided by an Article I court. See also Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). Thomas involved an action over
the price charged by one insecticide manufacturer to another for information required by the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act before a new product was registered. These
disputes were to be settled by an administrative arbitrator, with judicial review only for fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct. In another opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
deemed the private right to adjudication of these claims "so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement
by the Article III judiciary." 473 U.S. at 594.
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stitutional challenge. 39 Moreover, in areas other than adjudicative delega-
tion, the Court has displayed a new sympathy to separation of powers
challenges. 14°
The unsettled state of the law led Congress to hold extensive hearings in
1987 and seek opinions on the question of whether mandatory ALl adjudica-
tion, at the choice of the aggrieved party, would withstand constitutional at-
tack.'41 The Justice Department took the view that the bill would likely be
declared unconstitutional on Article III and seventh amendment grounds. 142
A number of legal scholars disputed the Justice Department's analysis, how-
ever. They interpreted Tull as not applicable to statutory schemes in which
adjudication has been assigned by Congress to an administrative agency.143 In
addition, they saw the balancing approach of Schor as insulating the proposed
Title VIII structure from a separation of powers challenge. The committee
seems to have been sufficiently persuaded by the latter analysis that it made no
substantial modifications to the bill.144
Once the bill reached the full Congress, however, it became apparent that
the Justice Department's arguments had provided enough ammunition to stop
139. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct.
2782 (1989), attacked the Thomas test of analyzing whether a right was "closely integrated into
a public regulatory scheme," as having no constitutional basis. 473 U.S. at 594 (Sclia, J.,
concurring). Balancing tests, he posited, have no application to the constitutional guarantees
set forth in Article III regarding adjudication of claims between citizens.
140. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), which struck down the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act as an unconstitutional delegation of executive power to the legislative
branch. Certain budget-cutting powers were placed with the Comptroller General who, the
Court determined, was controlled by Congress through its broad power to remove him. The
Court found the delegation to be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. "By placing
the responsibility for the execution of the [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act] in the hands of an
officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the
Act's execution and has unconstitutionally intruded into the executive function." Id. at 716.
Likewise, in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court struck down as a violation of
separation of powers a federal statute which authorized a one-house congressional veto of the
Attorney General's granting of compassionate suspension of deportation. Once Congress had
vested the power to make such determinations with the Attorney General, the Court reasoned,
it could not wrest it back by using the veto procedure, which violates the bicameralism and
executive presentment clauses of the Constitution.
But see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. CL 647 (1989) (upholding a delegation by Con-
gress to the United States Sentencing Commission, an agency made up of six members, three of
which are federal judges, and peculiarly placed in the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding Ethics in Government Act, which gives the Attorney General
power to appoint independent counselors to investigate and prosecute government officials for
federal criminal violations).
141. See Fair Housing Amendments Act: Hearings on S: 558 Before the Subcomni. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 585-843 0987) [here-
inafter 1987 Hearings].
142. Id. at 776, 795 (memorandum of Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
143. See id. at 570 (statement of Professor Girardeau Span); id. at 571 (statement of Dean
Paul Carrington); id. at 585, 721 & 755 (testimony of Professor Arthur Wolf); id. at 684 (testi-
mony of Professor Thomas Rowe).
144. Indeed, while the constitutional concerns raised are not frivolous, the vigor of their
assertion suggests that political rather than purely legal considerations were significant, if not
determinative.
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the legislation.14 The election procedure put forward by Representative Fish
rescued the bill from defeat. 146 The congressional debates primarily reflect a
sense of relief that a compromise was reached and indicate virtually no analy-
sis of the effect of the procedure on a major goal of the legislation - to pro-
vide expeditious and efficient resolution of complaints. 147 In part because the
election procedure was not the subject of committee consideration, its ramifi-
cations were never fully explored. 148
There is no question that removal will provide respondents with a real
opportunity to delay the process of complaint resolution. A responding party
does not have to elect removal until 120 days after the administrative com-
plaint is filed, assuming that the investigatory period has not been extended by
the agency. 149 The Justice Department then is afforded another thirty days to
commence an action in federal district court. Thus, it will take a minimum of
145. See 134 CONG. REc. H4606 (1988). On June 22, 1988, Representative Fish indicated
his intention to offer the "election" amendment that "responds to certain constitutional con-
cerns that have been raised in connection with the administrative enforcement mechanism." Id.
He stated:
In an effort to resolve this problem, I have worked closely with subcommittee
Chairman Don Edwards, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the NAACP,
the American Civil Liberties Union, civil rights litigation groups, and the National
Association of Realtors to formulate a compromise solution. Reflecting his strong
commitment to civil rights, Vice President Bush talked with me on more than one
occasion to offer his encouragement and personal assistance in this effort. The distin-
guished minority leader, Bob Michel, was also instrumental in forging this needed
compromise.
Under the terms of my proposed amendment, following the Secretary's issuance
of a charge, complainants, respondents, or any other aggrieved person would be given
the option of electing to go to a U.S. District Court rather than to go before an admin-
istrative law judge. This election option means that any of the affected persons could
unilaterally act to obtain a jury trial in these cases, after the HUD Secretary issues a
discrimination charge ....
Id.
146. See 134 CONG. REc. H4677 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (remarks of Representative Sen-
senbrenner). Representative Sensenbrenner was among those who questioned the Judiciary
Committee report endorsing mandatory administrative adjudication. Commenting on the elec-
tion procedure, he stated: "The solution was so simple, I wish we had come up with it years ago
.... [This] compromise... has broken the logjam that has prevented this Congress from
enacting a strengthening of the fair housing law for at least II years." See also id. (remarks of
Representative Michel).
147. Id. at H4676 (remarks of Representative Glickman) ("The two-track procedure of-
fered today... is expeditious, fair to both parties, and legally sound. It solves the constitutional
and administrative law questions.... but more important, this unique approach may serve as a
model for laws in the future."); see also id. at 4677 (remarks of Representative Michel) ("Under
the excellent amendment, authored and fostered by Mr. Fish, we are able to combine the effi-
cient, effective enforcement . with the option of a jury trial mandated by the seventh
amendment").
148. Senator Thurmond strongly objected to the fact that the Fish version of the legisla-
tion was not returned to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which had held hearings on the con-
stitutional issues. See 134 CONG. REc. S10457 (daily ed. August 1, 1988) ("this bill deserves the
consideration of the Judiciary Committee, and its thinking").
149. As noted supra at note 115, "HUD is not completing the investigative stage of the
complaint process within one hundred days." HUD correspondence, supra note 74 (emphasis
added).
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five months before the complaint is filed in court. The respondent thereafter
may utilize the full range of procedural devices that can cause discrimination
actions to languish for years, including motion practice, extensive discovery
and the litigation of discovery disputes. Moreover, insistence on a jury can
further delay substantially even an action ready for trial, given the current
docket congestion in the federal courts."'
There are some disadvantages to a respondent who elects federal court,
however, and corresponding advantages to the aggrieved party. The adminis-
trative proceeding limits the complainant to actual damages; civil penalties
assessed by an AIJ would inure to the government. In a removed action,
however, the respondent risks not only actual damages and civil penalties, but
also punitive damages payable to the aggrieved party, whether or not the ag-
grieved party intervenes in the federal action."' Despite these considerations,
however, it was the realtors' and builders' lobby that consistently objected to
mandatory agency adjudication and finally supported the Fish compromise,
which strongly suggests that the election procedure is viewed as beneficial to
and will be utilized by respondents.152
If this proves to be the case, aggrieved parties will reap only a partial
benefit from the FHAA. They will find themselves in federal court, as they
had under the original provisions of Title VIII, but with the assistance of gov-
ernment prosecution by the Justice Department. Even that benefit may prove
illusory, however, if the Justice Department does not vigorously fulfill its re-
sponsibilities, a legitimate concern given its track record on Title VHI enforce-
ment to date. 5 ' Aggrieved parties may find it necessary to intervene with
private counsel, thus leaving them in the same position, after a substantial
passage of time, as if they had pursued the private enforcement route.
C. The Choice of Simultaneous Proceedings
Many of the concerns outlined above can be addressed by the simultane-
ous filing of a private enforcement action under Section 3613 and an adminis-
trative complaint under Section 3610 of the FHAA. The statute clearly
150. See ADMINisTRATIVE OFmcE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT% REPORT TO THE
JuDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1989). This report noted that drug-related
criminal prosecutions have increased substantially and now heavily dominate the federal court
docket, making the trials of civil matters subject to tremendous delay. It has been estimated
that in a metropolitan federal district court, it takes an average of 2 1/2 years before a civil
matter is put down for trial.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 3642.
152. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 79.
153. See, eg., supra note 8. It is too early to judge the Department's commitment to the
litigation of individual actions for which it becomes responsible under the election procedure,
since only four cases have taken this route, according to the Department's statistical records.
See DEPARTmENT OF JusTicE, DOJ FAIR HOUSING AcT CASE AcTvrrY SiNcE MAcHC 12,
1989 (January 22, 1990). The Department has been more active, however, in its pattern and
practice litigation since the passage of the FHAA. It has filed 17 actions: seven based on race
discrimination, six based on familial status, and four on discrimination against the "handi-
capped." Id.
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permits this procedure, and indeed, HUD's regulations almost appear to en-
courage it.154 It represents the optimal enforcement strategy since an ag-
grieved party's options are not limited in any way by dual filings. While the
statute requires that administrative proceedings be halted if a federal trial is
commenced, it is unlikely that a federal court action would go to trial before
the commencement of an administrative hearing. If, however, the federal
court held an expedited trial, consolidated with a motion for preliminary re-
lief,"'5 for example, the aggrieved party obviously would benefit from the
rapid adjudication. In the more typical situation, the aggrieved party would
have the option to pursue the possibility of agency prosecution of the claim,
while not sacrificing the expeditious utilization of the available private reme-
dies. Moreover, the pendency of the federal action gives an aggrieved party
the opportunity for greater control and influence over the administrative pro-
cess in several ways.
First, the pendency of a court action allows the aggrieved party to seek
discovery against the respondent. This right equalizes the information-gather-
ing positions of the complainant and the respondent during the investigative
stage of the administrative process. And the discovery product obtained in the
federal action could be utilized to bolster the aggrieved party's case while the
agency is reaching its critical reasonable cause determination.' 6 This strategy
may prove particularly important if experience shows that HUD investigative
efforts are less than rigorous, or if the agency delays investigations under the
impracticability exception.
Another advantage of simultaneous filing is that it avoids delay in the
event that the agency finds no reasonable cause. An aggrieved party loses at
least 100 days during the investigative stage, and given the agency's view that
lack of resources is a sufficient excuse for not meeting the statutory deadlines,
there is the possibility that investigations will languish indefinitely. Since the
statutory scheme explicitly endorses dual proceedings prior to the trial stage,
there is little reason for complainants not to guard against possible delay. If,
of course, the agency finds reasonable cause, and neither party elects removal,
the federal action can be dismissed upon stipulation or by court order. 117
Third, the filing of simultaneous proceedings could also be used to influ-
ence the conciliation process at the administrative level. The structure of the
154. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28. The problems of the disallowance of dis-
covery to aggrieved parties during the investigation stage and the non-appealability of reason-
able cause determinations are alleviated, according to HUD, by the availability of private
enforcement action. See supra text accompanying note 90.
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (a)(2) (on an application for a preliminary injunction, the
court may order the consolidation of a trial on the merits).
156. If this strategy is to be utilized effectively, plaintiffs would be well-advised to serve
discovery requests along with the complaint, since responses should be obtained before the 100-
day investigatory period expires. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (depositions may be taken after 30
days after service of the complaint); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 34 (interrogatories and docu-
ment requests may be served with the complaint; defendant has 45 days to respond).
157. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
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FHAA provides little impetus for respondents to engage in serious settlement
discussions during the 100-day investigatory period. The respondent loses
nothing by simply waiting out the investigation to determine whether there is
a determination of reasonable cause, on the assumption that without such a
finding many aggrieved parties will abandon their claims. The filing of a fed-
eral court action along with an administrative complaint, however, gives no-
tice that the aggrieved party intends to pursue the claim vigorously through
every available procedure. And, whereas a respondent might not necessarily
obtain counsel at the early administrative stages, the pendency of a federal
court action virtually requires the expenditure of fees for representation.
Thus, dual filings may encourage the respondent to attempt a quick resolution
of the entire claim through serious participation in the conciliation process.
Fourth, early motion resolution in the federal courts might circumscribe
the agency's discretion with regard to reasonable cause determinations. For
example, if the aggrieved party's complaint survives a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the agency would be hard pressed to conclude that the
complaint does not constitute a violation of the Act from a legal, if not factual,
viewpoint. In the case of claims for which there does not yet exist an estab-
lished body of case law - in areas of discrimination on the basis of disability
or familial status, particularly - this strategy may prove effective in encour-
aging agency prosecution.
Finally, simultaneous filing may permit an aggrieved party some influ-
ence over the election process. A respondent facing the need to defend the
claim on two fronts through discovery may be willing to waive the right to
elect removal to federal court at a later time, in exchange for the aggrieved
party's agreement to the dismissal of the pending federal court action. The
aggrieved party may also engage in a certain amount of forum - or, more
precisely, opinion - shopping through this procedure. It seems likely that an
action brought pursuant to an election would be consolidated with a previ-
ously commenced private action.158 Thus, the aggrieved party, by filing a fed-
eral court action, can determine whether to pursue the claim in that forum,
given the possibility that a removed agency prosecution will be joined with it,
or to dismiss the action, thereby allowing another opportunity for a federal
court forum in the event of removal.
The filing of the same claim in two fora may seem contrary to notions of
judicial economy and restraint. Courts initially may view federal court hous-
ing discrimination filings as unnecessarily duplicative of the administrative
remedies. However, Congress' intention to allow dual proceedings up until
the point of trial is clear on the face of the statute and from its legislative
history. While a defendant in a federal court action might seek a stay pending
resolution of the administrative proceeding, a court would be hard pressed to
grant such a motion given the structure of the FHAA.
158. See FED. R. Qiv. P. 42(a) (actions involving common questions of law or fact may be
consolidated by court order).
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III.
REFERRAL TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES
The procedural reforms contemplated by the FHAA are rendered illu-
sory in many instances by the "grandfathering" of state and local agencies as
the appropriate forum for claim resolution. Under Section 3610(f) of the stat-
ute, HUD must continue to refer complaints to state and local agencies certi-
fied by the agency as of September 13, 1988.59 States and localities maintain
their certification for forty months, during which period it is intended that the
legislatures amend their statutes to make them equivalent to federal law. 16°
This provision in essence means that most aggrieved parties will not reap
the advantages of the federal enforcement scheme. At the time that the
FHAA was enacted, some thirty-six states and seventy-six localities were cer-
tified. 16 1 In 1987, of the 4,699 housing complaints filed with HUD, 3,388 -
or approximately 75% - were referred to certified agencies. 162 These state
and local schemes of fair housing enforcement vary tremendously, 163 but it is
fair to say that many do not even approach the procedural rights and remedies
contained in the new federal statute. For example, not all states and localities
provide for administrative hearings,164 time limits on the processing of com-
plaints, 165 and the right to attorney's fees or unlimited damages. 166 The HUD
159. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f) (West Supp. 1989). In terms of future certification, the HUD
regulations make clear that "substantial equivalence" in rights and remedies will be strictly
required. Not only must the state and local legislation be equivalent on paper, it must be
demonstrated that by the agency's practices and performance that the law "in operation" pro.
vides the same rights and remedies. Among the specific equivalences required are that the
agency must complete investigations within 100 days and render a disposition within one year
"unless impracticable," and have authority to grant actual damages and civil penalties or ar-
range for court adjudication at agency expense allowing the award of actual and punitive dam-
ages. There must be provisions for judicial review of agency action, as well as a private right of
action, permitting actual and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees. See 24 C.F.R. § 115
(1989).
160. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 35 ("This allows most jurisdictions sufficient
time to conform their laws to the new federal standards so that they may remain certified.").
An additional grace period of eight months may be granted by the Secretary in jurisdictions
where additional time is needed due to the infrequency of legislative session. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
161. See 24 CFR § 115.6(f)(1) (1989). For a list of certified agencies, see also J.
KUSHNER, supra note 77, at app. 8-1.
162. See 134 CONG. REc. H4606 (June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Fish).
163. See Kushner, supra note 8, at 1099 ("Too many jurisdictions-reflecting an earlier
era when housing bias was acceptable to the majority-have limited the reach of, or remedies
under, fair housing laws").
164. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 17. Among the certified states that do not
provide administrative hearings are Florida, Maine, Nebraska, North Carolina and Virginia.
See 1987 Hearings, supra note 141, at 607-08 (app. B to testimony of Prof. Arthur Wolf).
165. In New York, for example, there is a backlog of more than 10,000 cases before the
state agency responsible for employment and housing discrimination claims, and some claim-
ants wait as long as seven years for a resolution. Case Backlog is Swamping Rights Agency, N.Y.
Times, July 17, 1989, at B1, col. 5.
166. For example, while California is a certified state and will remain so for 40 months, it
limits punitive damages to "a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 52 (Deering 1989); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071(2) (West Supp. 1989)
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regulations make clear that grandfathered certification does not constitute a
determination that the agency is substantially equivalent in administrative or
judicial remedies.16 7
The grandfathering provision is particularly problematic in the areas of
discrimination based on familial status and disability. Since these bases of
discrimination were not illegal under the Fair Housing Act prior to its amend-
ment, HUD did not consider whether states or localities provided such protec-
tion in determining whether to grant certification. Thus, the question arises
whether complaints alleging these newly prohibited discriminatory acts will be
referred or retained by HUD. The statute does not address this issue, and its
legislative history is less than clear. The House Report notes that some certi-
fied agencies protect these classes from discrimination, but if an agency does
not, the Committee does not intend that such complaints be referred; jurisdic-
tion would remain with the Secretary "until the agency is certified as substan-
tially equivalent for the new classes."' 68 The Report does not elaborate,
however, on how extensive the protection afforded these classes must be in
order that referral be considered appropriate, nor do the legislative debates
address the issue.
One HUD regulation governing this issue indicates that no grandfathered
agency will be considered certified for complaints alleging familial status or
disability discrimination.169 Another section of the regulations states that "no
complaint based in whole or in part on allegations of discrimination on the
basis of familial status or handicap shall be referred to [a grandfathered
agency] without regard to whether the fair housing law administered by [the]
agency appears to prohibit discrimination based on familial status or handi-
cap.' 170 Thus, it seems that under HUD's interpretation, the agency would
not refer such complaints. In practice, however, it appears that HUD is refer-
ring complaints to certain agencies for investigation, if not for "cause" deter-
uination, on a contractual basis. 17 1
Until the treatment of complaints of disability and family status discrimi-
nation is clarified, aggrieved parties in these classes run substantial risks
should they attempt to utilize the administrative process. For example, as a
substantive matter, the FHAA clearly protects persons with AIDS or HIV-
infection. 72 State or local law may bar discrimination on the basis of disabil-
(actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees cannot exceed S8,500); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1988) ($2000 cap on all damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 1505(c) (West 1987) ($1000 limit on punitive damages). In fact, of the 42 states that have
enacted fair housing statutes, only three contain specific authorization of some punitive award.
See 1987 Hearings, supra note 137, at 607-08 (app. B to testimony of Prof. Arthur Wolf).
167. See 24 C.F.R. § 115.6(d)(2) (1989).
168. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 35.
169. 24 C.F.R. § 115.6(d)(1) (1989).
170. 24 C.F.R. § 115.10(b) (1989).
171. HUD correspondence, supra note 74. Florida apparently has had such an arrange-
ment with HUD. Id. This referral process arguably violates the Act.
172. See HoUsE REPORT, supra note 9, at 18, 22 and n.55; see also 134 CoNG. REc.
H4599-06 (1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss); 134 CONG. REC. H4921-4922 (1988) (statement of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1989-90]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
ity, but by excluding some categories of disability, the protection provided by
the state or local statute may not be as broad as that of federal law. If HUD
refers a complaint not covered by state or local law, the aggrieved party may
find herself not only procedurally but substantively denied the scope of protec-
tion afforded under the FHAA. Therefore, before a complaint is filed alleging
disability or family status discrimination, it will be necessary to carefully ana-
lyze the substantive statutory provisions of the state or locality to which refer-
ral would be appropriate. In the event that the party's likelihood of success is
greater under the FHAA,1 73 a private federal court action would seem the
only prudent route, assuming that there is some chance that HUD will refer
complaints of disability or family status discrimination.
For those alleging forms of discrimination barred under the 1968 Act in
jurisdictions certified by HUD, complaints presumably will be referred as a
matter of course. Thus, the choice between federal court and administrative
proceedings must be considered in light of the procedural peculiarities of state
and local schemes. If a state scheme, for example, severely restricts monetary
recovery, has a history of delayed complaint processing and resolution, or ne-
cessitates retention of counsel for effective enforcement, the federal court
processes may be more advantageous.
One alternative course is available to litigants faced with the choice be-
tween federal court and referral of the complaint to a jurisdiction where proce-
dural protections are not as broad as those of FHAA. The statute permits
HUD to reactivate a referred complaint if the certified agency fails to com-
mence proceedings within thirty days of referral or fails to carry forward the
proceedings with "reasonable promptness." 74 HUD regulations state that it
must confer with the certified agency to determine the reasons for delay before
utilizing this.reactivation provision, and if it appears that the process will then
proceed expeditiously, HUD has discretion to leave the complaint with the
certified agency. 175 The term "reasonable promptness" is not defined. How-
ever, the performance standards for certification after the grandfathering pe-
riod require that investigations be completed within 100 days, and final
Rep. Waxman); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (persons with
AIDS are persons with "handicap" under FHAA).
173. According to one authority, not a single local or state law would meet the "substan-
tially equivalent" standard with respect to the newly protected classes. See Milstein, Pepper &
Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 140. Only 16 states offer any protection against discrimination
based on familial status, and most of those statutes are weaker, substantively and procedurally,
than the FHAA. See Morales, Creating New Housing Opportunities for Families with Children:
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 744, 750 (1988).
174. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(2) (West Supp. 1989). Another provision allows the recall of a
complaint if the Secretary determines that the agency is no longer qualified for certification, that
is, the agency is no longer substantially equivalent. Id. Since state and local agencies need not
meet the "substantially equivalent" standard for 40 months, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(4) (West
Supp. 1989), however, it would seem that this provision could not be utilized until the expira-
tion of that period of time.
175. 24 C.F.R. § 103.110(c) (1989).
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administrative disposition take place within one year.176 These time limits
might serve as parameters for "reasonable promptness."
Neither the regulations nor the statute provide any procedural guidance
regarding how the reactivation provisions are to be set in motion, however.
Certified agencies are not required to advise HUD of their progress in resolv-
ing referred complaints, and there is no provision for HUD to engage in in-
dependent monitoring. Presumably, therefore, it is up to the aggrieved party
to notify HUD of any delay. Litigants who would profit from the utilization
of the FHAA procedures, as compared to those of a certified agency to which
their complaint has been referred, should petition HUD for reactivation if it
appears that prompt action is not forthcoming. A showing of a pattern of
delay would be useful in encouraging HUD to recover jurisdiction. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, an aggrieved party filing such a petition would
be entitled to prompt notice of the agency's decision to deny a request for
reactivation, and a brief statement of the grounds," and there is the possibil-
ity of judicial review of such a denial.178 Unless the reactivation provision is
vigorously pursued, it is unlikely that the FHAA's promise of expeditious
processing will be fully realized until the grandfathering period expires.
CONCLUSION
With the passage of the FHAA, fair housing enforcement has entered a
new era. There is no question that the Act increases the enforcement options
and opportunities for those with complaints of discrimination, and creates
greater deterrents to illegal housing practices. But the Act also creates diffi-
cult choices for litigants. Despite its surface appeal, the administrative en-
forcement scheme poses some significant disincentives for aggrieved parties.
The scheme requires a party to forego substantial monetary relief from puni-
tive damage awards in exchange for agency prosecution which may or may
not prove vigorous and effective. Given the removal election, this trade-off
does not even guarantee the simplicity and expedition contemplated by the
administrative enforcement option. And few litigants will profit by the admin-
istrative scheme until state and local agencies bring their substantive and pro-
cedural protections into compliance with the FHAA, which may take up to
four years.
The concerns voiced here about the administrative process are based
somewhat on theoretical constructs. 17 9 It may turn out, however, that HUD
176. 24 C.F.R. § 115.4(b)(2) (1989).
177. Administrative Procedure Act § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(e); see also American Horse
Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
179. There are no enforcement models in the civil rights context that have comparable
procedures. The nineteenth century civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
provide no administrative enforcement mechanisms. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the first modem civil rights statute, employment discrimination complainants have a lim-
ited exhaustion requirement. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (1982). They must allow the EEOC 180 days
to investigate and attempt to conciliate the claim, before filing a private federal court action. Id.
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will conduct thorough investigations within the statutory time limits. Reason-
able cause determinations may comport with the remedial purposes of the
Act, with the benefit of any doubt given to the complainant, thus making judi-
cial review an unnecessary check on agency discretion.1 0 The agency may act
quickly to reactivate complaints not promptly processed at the state or local
level, thus mitigating the delay on procedural reform created by the
grandfathering provisions. Finally, respondents may choose not to remove
charges to federal court, thus permitting rapid adjudication within the admin-
istrative framework."" But a preliminary reading of agency policy - as ex-
pressed in the HUD regulations - does not bode well. And the early
evidence of prosecutorial zeal is not overwhelming: in the first eleven months
since the FHAA became effective, with over one thousand matters filed, HUD
has accepted the cases of only fifteen complainants."8 2 Until more empirical
evidence is collected, and the agency's enforcement track record can be evalu-
ated, the risk of relying exclusively on the administrative route seems to out-
weigh its potential advantages. Simultaneous or sole reliance on private
enforcement through the federal courts guards against the pitfalls that surface
upon a close examination of the agency's adjudicatory mechanisms.
If a complainant chooses to pursue the administrative route rather than file in federal court, the
EEOC may issue a reasonable cause determination, but there is no provision for an administra-
tive hearing. The agency may then commence an action in federal court if conciliation fails, but
it is not mandated to do so. Id. Procedures under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
are similar. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 all prohibit discrimination
against certain classes in programs receiving federal financial assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1982), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982). Under these statutes, an administra-
tive hearing procedure is in place, but the only remedy available is the withdrawal of federal
funds. Monetary relief for the aggrieved party can be pursued through an implied private right
of action, for which no exhaustion is required. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624 (1984); Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
180. But see supra note 115.
181. Id.
182. See HUD correspondence, supra note 74. But see Lavelle, Stiffer Housing Law Gets
Results, Natl L.J., at 3, col. 1 (October 2, 1989) (lauding the Justice Department's enforcement
efforts).
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